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I
INTRODUCTION
Many may presume that the authority of an international court (IC) is
evolutionary and largely unidirectional. This article shows that the authority of
the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) rapidly and
almost immediately became extensive, but nonetheless remains fragile and at
risk of decline, and even (potentially) rapid decline. The AB is a young but
remarkably authoritative IC even though the founders of the WTO did not
deign to call it a court, arguably in the hope of constraining its authority.
Particularly remarkable is how the AB almost immediately established not
merely narrow (litigant-specific) authority and intermediate (membership-level)
authority, but extensive field-level authority. Such rapid development of
extensive field authority is arguably a unique case in international politics at the
multilateral level. Yet this authority remains fragile, and it could decline
rapidly.
The WTO’s current system of resolving disputes has been in existence for
nearly twenty years and builds radically from a previous system under the
1
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) created in 1948. The
interpretation, application, and enforcement of WTO rules take place through a
two-tiered dispute settlement system composed of dispute settlement panels
and an appeals process, complemented by a peer-review system of over seventy
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WTO councils, committees, working parties, and other groupings, including a
2
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The AB lies at the apex of the WTO dispute
settlement system and consists of seven members appointed by the DSB. These
members serve four-year terms that are renewable once. Although the AB
members are not formally called judges, the AB operates as an international
appellate trade court created to enforce trade rules. Today, the WTO’s dispute
settlement system is arguably the most authoritative judicial institution at the
multilateral level in world politics.
WTO members broadly accept the AB’s authority to “clarify” the meaning
of WTO law, even if begrudgingly when they lose a case. A broad array of
WTO members use WTO dispute settlement, and the AB and first-level panels
have issued over ninety thousand pages of highly technical and legalistic
3
jurisprudence. This was not the case for dispute settlement under the GATT.
Until the 1970s, the GATT was “dominated by an ‘anti-legal’ culture,” in which
4
the authority of panels was highly circumscribed. This article explains the
change from a venue based on political negotiations to resolve disagreements to
a sophisticated dispute settlement system and presents empirical indicators of
the rise of AB authority. The article also addresses, in parallel, the challenges
the AB confronts in sustaining its high level of authority, which remains fragile.
Part II of this article defines and presents a typology of IC authority,
building from the authority framework described by Alter, Helfer, and
5
Madsen. Part III reviews the transformation from the diplomatic–political
GATT dispute resolution mechanism with narrow authority to a fully fledged
WTO dispute settlement system with extensive authority. Part IV presents
various empirical indicators of the rapid rise of the AB’s extensive authority.
Part V analyzes the challenges the AB confronts in maintaining its authority,
which shows signs of decline. Part VI concludes regarding the AB’s current and
future authority.
II
A TYPOLOGY OF GATT/WTO JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
In accord with the Alter, Helfer, and Madsen framework, this article
defines IC authority as a form of power consisting of two components: (1) the
recognition and acceptance of an obligation to comply with a court’s rulings;
and (2) some form of meaningful practice giving effect to such rulings, whether
involving meaningful steps toward compliance or acceptance of authorized
2. Bernard Hoekman, Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment, 20 MINN. J.
INT’L L. 324, 330 (2011).
3. Compiled from the WTO Online Bookshop. See Articles: Nouvelles publications, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://onlinebookshop.wto.org/shop/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (listing page count for
each annual compilation of dispute settlement reports).
4. Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and
Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 350, 350 (2002).
5. Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the
Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016 at 9–12.
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sanctions, a form of contractual remedy. The typology tracks the degree of the
authority of an IC in relation to the IC’s audience.
Narrow authority exists when the parties to a particular dispute recognize
that they are legally bound by the court’s ruling and take steps to comply with it
7
or be subject to authorized countermeasures. In the WTO context, narrow
authority exists when a respondent and complainant in a particular WTO
dispute believe they are bound by the AB’s ruling in that dispute and take
meaningful steps to give effect to that legal obligation or accept authorized
countermeasures, such as the complainant’s suspension of an equivalent
amount of concessions pursuant to Article 22 of the WTO Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute
8
Settlement Understanding, or DSU). Indicators of narrow authority include
partial or full compliance with AB decisions; payment of compensation; or
acceptance of authorized countermeasures that end tit-for-tat, retaliatory,
protectionist actions. The particular dispute is thus settled through law.
Intermediate authority exists when a similarly situated group of actors
9
recognizes the IC ruling as authoritative and responds accordingly. In the
context of the WTO, the group consists of the potential pool of future litigants
among WTO Members. When the AB exercises intermediate authority, other
WTO Members will modify or consider modifying existing regulatory practices
and tailor new regulatory initiatives in light of AB case law. Indicators of
intermediate authority include citations of AB case law by participants in a
dispute and by panels; greater participation of Members as third parties in
WTO litigation because of their concern with the impact of AB decisions in
construing the meaning of WTO rules for future cases; increases in the size of
WTO delegations and the inclusion of lawyers because of the importance of
legal developments in Geneva; evidence of strategic litigation involving trade
benefits that do not cover litigation costs; and shadow of law effects from AB
decisions—that is, evidence that nonlitigating WTO members modify their laws,
practices, and regulatory initiatives in light of AB jurisprudence.
Extensive authority exists when a larger field of actors, including other
government officials, domestic and international courts, legal professionals,
firms, civil society, and academics, follow and argue over the law’s
interpretation and practice, and accept the IC’s rulings as authoritative and
10
requiring a meaningful response. Extensive authority encompasses narrow and
intermediate authority (and thus the empirical indicators noted above), but
6. Id. at 7.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 22, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401[hereinafter DSU].
9. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5, at 10.
10. Id. at 10–11. It could then constitute a juridical field in the sense used by Pierre Bourdieu. See
generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 805 (1987) (likening the juridical field to a culture, organized around a body of internal norms,
assumptions, behaviors, and values).

SHAFFER_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE)

240

1/28/2016 4:28 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79:237

goes much further in its normative reach. In the WTO context, it signifies that
AB jurisprudence not only affects WTO Members’ understanding of their
commitments but also broader political, social, and professional understandings
that inform domestic and international policy debates. Indicators of extensive
AB authority include widespread use of the WTO dispute settlement system;
references to WTO rules in domestic political and administrative processes;
citations to WTO case law by domestic courts and other ICs; public
participation in WTO fora; casebooks and specialized journals addressing WTO
law; articles in legal journals on WTO law and jurisprudence; and academics
teaching international trade law. Some of these indicators may not reflect actual
changes in nation-state, business, and other behavior, but they nonetheless form
part of larger interactional social processes over time that help to embed an IC’s
authority, thereby facilitating narrow and intermediate authority.
An IC’s authority can be extensive, yet also fragile in light of the political
11
implications of its decisions. Because of such fragility, just as IC authority can
rapidly rise, it can also rapidly decline. An IC may exercise restraint and limit
the scope of its rulings in order to protect its authority, thereby constraining its
own power. Actors may also limit the scope of an IC’s authority by not bringing
cases under its jurisdiction. WTO Members’ purposeful omission to challenge
the legality of each other’s preferential trade agreements serves as a prime
example of this circumvention of jurisdiction. As a result, an IC may exercise
authority in only some areas that fall within its jurisdiction. In addition,
compliance with a ruling does not always reflect IC authority, because an actor
may, at the same time that it formally complies with a ruling, apply a new
measure that undermines the effectiveness of the legal ruling. This phenomenon
12
of “uncompliance” calls into question the IC’s actual authority.
The core research question of this article is: What explains the rapid, almost
immediate rise of AB authority, and how stable (or fragile) is it? This article
addresses three sets of contextual factors—institutional design, constituencies,
and geopolitical context—in combination with the AB’s agency. Institutional
design issues include the existence of compulsory or ad hoc jurisdiction; access
rules, such as access being limited to nation-states or open to private parties or
international secretariats; and alternatives to litigation before the IC, such as
conciliation and mediation, on the one hand, and forum shopping to another IC,
on the other hand. Constituencies refers to actors within national governments,
such as executives, judiciaries, and administrative bodies, and outside of
governments, such as legal professionals, corporations, nongovernmental
organizations, and academics. Geopolitical context includes structural, material,
and ideational power playing out in global, regional, and local contexts. This
article addresses the role of these different external factors over time while
stressing their interaction with the agency of the AB itself in the construction
and maintenance of its authority. The baselines against which this article
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. See infra notes 171–175 and accompanying text.
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assesses the rise of AB authority are two-fold: the counterfactual of a global
trade system without a third party dispute settlement institution, and the actual
GATT system before the AB’s creation.
III
THE CONSTRUCTION OF EXTENSIVE AB AUTHORITY FROM A NARROW
GATT BASE
A. The GATT’s Patchwork Narrow Authority
To understand the authority of the WTO AB, this article first assesses the
development of dispute settlement under the GATT, which was much less
legalized in terms of the scope and precision of legal texts and the automaticity
of third-party dispute settlement. The GATT membership initially consisted of
twenty-three contracting parties, expanded to 102 members by 1979 (the end of
the Tokyo Round), and included 123 members in 1994—just before the WTO’s
13
creation. The institutional design of the GATT was less welcoming to
legalization. Under the GATT, the entire membership had to approve by
consensus the creation of a panel, the selection of the panelists, and the
14
adoption of a panel decision. Because the respondent in a dispute could block
the dispute from proceeding at any of these stages, these requirements gave rise
to considerable delay and, at times, complete blockage of the proceedings.
The GATT panelists generally did not consist of lawyers and they were not
even supported by lawyers within the GATT secretariat until well into the
15
fourth decade of the GATT’s history. The entire membership, in the form of
the GATT Council, heard and ruled on disputes until, as the membership grew,
the Council created panels of five, and then three, members to hear the case
and write the report. The panelists generally consisted of diplomats based in
Geneva. The panelists’ reports were initially a matter of a few pages, but as they
became more developed, they continued to use vague and compromising
language. The result, in Robert Hudec’s words, was the creation of a
“diplomat’s jurisprudence,” which was case-by-case, and thus litigant-specific, in
16
orientation. The fact that either the complainant or respondent could block
the adoption of the panel’s report spurred the diplomat–panelists—whose
governments themselves could later be subject to claims—to write diplomatic
compromises that would facilitate settlement. As Joseph Weiler writes,
“crafting outcomes which would command the consent of both parties and thus
17
be adoptable was the principal task of the Panellists.” As Joost Pauwelyn
13. The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
14. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 43–55, 167–82 (1993).
15. Id. at 167–72, 300.
16. Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 615, 615 (1970).
17. Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the

SHAFFER_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE)

242

1/28/2016 4:28 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79:237

explains, the original GATT was “like a gentlemen’s club . . . . Its objective was
18
to settle trade problems, not create or clarify trade law.”
The result of this diplomatic infusion into the panels was a narrow, litigantspecific authority of the GATT, at best, and certainly not intermediate
authority over the entire membership. The craft of producing acceptable
diplomatic reports received support from like-minded trade diplomats in
Geneva, but GATT members (and in particular powerful members) remained
19
reluctant to accept legalized discourse or rulings against them. In some cases,
20
reports came to no clear legal conclusion or guidance for the future. In other
cases, parties could and did block a report’s adoption, particularly when
21
domestically sensitive policies were at stake. Additionally, even if a report was
adopted, no effective system of remedies existed. The GATT contracting
parties authorized countermeasures only once during the GATT’s entire
history, in a proceeding involving a claim of the Netherlands against the United
States in 1953, in which the Netherlands neither adopted the retaliation nor
22
received satisfaction.
Table 1 provides an overview of the number of GATT cases per decade with
established panels. It shows a larger number of cases in the 1950s, for which
diplomat–panelists wrote short and vague reports aimed to help settle disputes
under the new GATT rules. The amount of cases dropped sharply in the 1960s
in the context of the Cold War and the rise of the European Community (EC).
In the geopolitical context of the Cold War, the United States often refrained
from confronting its allies on trade issues.
Table 1: GATT Cases
Year
1950–1959
1960–1969
1970–1979
1980–1989
Total

23

Total
Complaints
53
7
32
115
207

Rulings
(% of total)
21 (40%)
5 (71%)
15 (47%)
47 (41%)
88 (43%)

Settled
(% of otal)
22 (42%)
2 (29%)
12 (38%)
28 (24%)
64 (31%)

Withdrawn
(% of total)
10 (19%)
0 (0%)
5 (16%)
40 (35%)
55 (27%)

Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 197 (2001).
18. Joost H. Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005).
19. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 354, 364 (1993) (noting in particular the United States and the EC).
20. See, e.g., US–Margins of Preference (Aug. 9, 1949), II GATT B.I.S.D. at 11 (1952).
21. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 158 (2d ed. 2008) (noting
non-implementation and blockage in the eighties and early nineties).
22. Working Party Report, Netherlands Action Under Article XXIII:2, L/61 (Nov. 7, 1952),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/gattdocs_e.htm.
23. Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948–1989, 2
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 18 (1993) (stating that parties could no longer block the establishment of
panels as of 1989).
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After the Cold War abated in the 1980s and there was a push for greater
trade liberalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, some GATT contracting
parties more frequently used the GATT process, as Table 1 reflects. The
process also became more legalized following the GATT contracting parties’
agreement in 1979 to formalize procedural practices under the Tokyo Round
24
Dispute Settlement Understanding. In 1982, the GATT Director-General
created a small legal affairs division within the secretariat composed of three
lawyers that staffed GATT disputes and became a reservoir of knowledge of
GATT case law. These lawyers became important for the drafting of reports,
giving rise to a somewhat more legalized jurisprudence in the late 1980s and
25
early 1990s. A number of GATT reports in the 1980s created clearer legal
precedent for future litigation, and GATT dispute settlement arguably moved
26
toward the possibility of exercising intermediate authority.
In 1988, in the midst of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, GATT
members agreed to make the formation of panels automatic until the Uruguay
27
Round’s conclusion. The decision was driven, in part, by aggressive U.S.
unilateral action to enforce the U.S. government’s view of trade obligations
28
under Section 301 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act. The contracting parties
experience under the GATT and their dissatisfaction with the alternative of
U.S. unilateralism provided precursors for the subsequent leap to extensive
29
field authority with the WTO’s AB. Yet most of GATT’s then-expanded
membership did not engage with the dispute settlement system. In fact, the EC
and the United States were party to 92% of all GATT cases launched, although
a larger number of countries became slightly more involved by the end of the
30
GATT period.
B. Leap to the AB’s Extensive Authority
The WTO dispute settlement system represents a significant legalization
leap in world politics in which the AB rapidly developed extensive field-level
authority. The impact of the design changes that went into effect in 1995 quickly
became embedded through WTO members’ active use of the new system, often
working in conjunction with affected private parties who increasingly
referenced the new case law. Although WTO members apparently believed that
24. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 40–55.
25. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First
Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 11–14 (1999) (tracking the strengthening procedural and
political developments within GATT during this period).
26. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 51, 81–83 (1987)
(discussing the growth of GATT case load and trust).
27. HUDEC, supra note 19, at 182–88. The decision was implemented on a trial basis starting May
1, 1989.
28. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2012).
29. See generally Manfred Elsig & Jappe Eckhardt, The Creation of the Multilateral Trade Court:
Design and Experiential Learning, WORLD TRADE REV. 13, 14 (2015) (explaining the AB’s legalization
leap through experiential learning).
30. Robert E. Hudec et al., supra note 23, at 30.
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the AB would be used only infrequently to correct clearly erroneous panel
31
32
reports, in practice over 66.85% of panel decisions have been appealed, a rate
of appeals that provided the AB an opportunity to build a more robust and
coherent international trade law jurisprudence.
The dispute settlement reforms of 1995 incorporated five critical design
changes that enabled this legalization leap. First, a respondent can no longer
block the establishment of a panel, so that all WTO Members have an
33
automatic right to one. Second, the time period between the initiation of a
34
complaint and the issuance of a panel and AB decision has been formalized.
Although parties may stretch out the process and panels extend time periods in
complex cases, the formalized process creates limits that facilitate more
expeditious and dependable judicial decisionmaking. Third, AB rulings and
panel decisions that are not appealed are automatically binding upon the parties
35
to the dispute. In theory, the DSB can block their adoption by reverse
36
consensus —that is, by a decision of all WTO members, including the
prevailing party—but this has never occurred in practice. Fourth, the AB
37
reviews the legal bases of the panel findings, which has led to a more legalized
and coherent body of jurisprudence. Fifth, when a respondent does not comply,
the complainant can seek authorization to withdraw concessions in an amount
determined by binding third party arbitration, which is usually before the
38
original panel. This decentralized enforcement mechanism grants the
complainant leverage by strategically threatening the trade interests of the
respondent’s industries. That economic leverage, compounded by Members’
concerns over reciprocity and reputation among the broader WTO
membership, enhances the likelihood of compliance.
A number of factors explain why WTO Members agreed to these radical
design changes. First, the dispute settlement system’s creation occurred in a
particular historical conjuncture—that of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
collapse of the Soviet economic development model, which took place three
years into the Uruguay Round negotiations. This historic change, coupled with
the parallel success of export-oriented development models in East Asia,
facilitated the rise of neoliberal ideology. The United States and EC (since
2003, the European Union, or EU) were the unrivaled economic powers at the
time, and they led the negotiations to a successful conclusion. This structural

31. Elsig & Eckhardt, supra note 29, at 20.
32. Dispute Settlement: Statistics, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/stats_e.htm (last visited June 5, 2014).
33. See DSU, supra note 8, art. VI, ¶ 1, art. VIII, ¶ 5.
34. See The process—Stages in a typical WTO dispute settlement case, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm (last visited July 12,
2015) (using a flowchart to show the stages of WTO settlement).
35. DSU, supra note 8, art. XVI, ¶¶ 2–4.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. XVII, ¶¶ 1–2.
38. Id. art. XXII.
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and ideational context facilitated the signature of a package of nineteen WTO
agreements, backed by formal dispute settlement and representing the
institutionalization of global trade competition.
Second, the United States became much more aggressive in advancing its
trade interests once it no longer had to prioritize Cold War concerns. Given the
relative weakness of the GATT dispute settlement system and the limits of
GATT rules over issues of increasing U.S. concern, such as trade in services and
the protection of intellectual property rights, the United States increasingly
used unilateral pressures to enforce and advance its interests. The targeted
GATT members complained to no avail. As a compromise under the new WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, the United States agreed to exclusively use
the WTO dispute settlement system as part of an overall “single undertaking”
in which countries agreed to expand the scope of trade rules under the WTO
39
umbrella. The negotiations over the redesigned dispute settlement system, in
other words, were conducted in the shadow of U.S. unilateralism in a post–Cold
War context.
Third, GATT (and then WTO) members came to accept that there was no
meaningful alternative to the GATT for trade disputes, even though developed
countries had earlier considered the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development and developing countries looked to the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development. Even today, despite the proliferation
of hundreds of preferential trade agreements with their own dispute settlement
provisions, these provisions are not often used. The WTO remains the prime
40
venue for settling trade disputes.
The above factors are not sufficient, however, to account for the
tremendous shift that occurred. Factors largely endogenous to the negotiations
contributed significantly to the AB’s creation. The idea for an appellate body
developed late in the negotiations when it became clear that the EC and Japan
would agree that a party could not block a panel’s establishment and the
41
adoption of its reports in return for a constraint on U.S. unilateralism. Once
the EC and Japan agreed to make WTO dispute settlement automatic, the
negotiators addressed how to ensure the reliable quality of panel reports.
Consensus emerged among negotiators that a review mechanism should be
created as a check against poor quality reports. The U.S. support was
lukewarm, at best, on the idea of creating the AB, but in the end it accepted the
AB’s creation because U.S. negotiators thought that the appeal mechanism
39. See CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 48–52 (2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_02_e.pdf
(describing single undertaking and its role).
40. Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New
Concepts, in TRADE COOPERATION: THE PURPOSE, DESIGN AND EFFECTS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS 319, 319 (Andreas Dür & Manfred Elsig eds., 2015).
41. See Manfred Elsig, Legalization Leap in Context: The Design of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
System 21–22 (Nat’l Ctrs. of Competence in Research Trade Regulation, Working Paper No. 2013/13,
2013) (discussing blocking a panel’s establishment).
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would only be used in rare cases, would not greatly prolong the process, and
would most likely confirm panel findings, allowing the United States to apply
42
retaliatory measures approved by WTO institutions. As Peter Van den
Bossche put it, the agreement over the AB “was an inspired afterthought,
rather than the reflection of a grand design to create a strong, new international
43
court.”
Some of the design rules could, in theory, constrain the normative authority
of the AB, but have so far been less constraining in practice. For example, the
DSU does not refer to the AB as a “court,” nor the AB members as “judges,”
but rather refers to them as “persons” who comprise “the Appellate Body
44
membership” and who have “demonstrated expertise in law.” DSU Article 19
further provides that the AB only makes “recommendations” regarding
45
compliance, such that the AB lacks the injunctive powers of a domestic court.
In practice, WTO Members retain the option not to comply with an AB
ruling but rather to be subject to countermeasures that rebalance concessions.
This feature provides some flexibility, so that if the AB issues a decision that a
Member finds politically costly, it does not need to defy the AB, but it rather
can accept the withdrawal of equivalent concessions. DSU Article 3 also
provides that “recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at
achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights
46
and obligations under this Understanding and under the covered agreements.”
This suggests that Members can use the AB legal rulings and recommendations
as a focal point around which they ultimately settle their disputes, sometimes
years after concessions have been withdrawn, as happened in the EC–
47
Hormones case—a dispute over the EC’s ban on imports of meat from cattle
48
treated with specific growth hormones—and in the EC–Bananas III case.
These are reasons why, in the words of former AB Member Claus-Dieter
Elhermann, the WTO dispute settlement system still can be viewed as a “quasi49
judicial mechanism.”
Finally, the formal adoption of the AB’s rulings and recommendations by
the DSB provides both an opportunity for Members to criticize AB rulings and
an institutional space for Members to be socialized by the rulings. In theory,
42. Id. at 23.
43. Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centerpiece: The WTO Appellate Body and Its
Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, in THE WTO AT 10: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 286, 294 (G. Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2006).
44. DSU, supra note 8, art. XVII.
45. Id. art. XIX.
46. Id. art. III.
47. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products,¶ 2, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R / WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998).
48. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 4, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted Nov. 26, 2008) [hereinafter EC–
Bananas].
49. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 469,
470 (2003).
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Members can use the DSB meetings to attempt to discipline the AB, especially
if the membership appears unified. Such group action, however, has only
50
occurred once, following the AB ruling in the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle case
regarding the acceptance of unsolicited amicus curiae submissions under DSU
Article 13, to which all participating Members but the United States
51
vociferously objected. Ironically, however, the actual practice of DSB approval
by reverse consensus of all AB decisions serves to enhance the AB’s authority.
The DSB meets every month and most of the WTO membership attends DSB
52
meetings. In preparing for, engaging in, and hearing the discussions at the
meetings, Member officials are more likely to internalize the decisions. In no
other international dispute settlement system do member state officials
regularly meet to discuss legal decisions. In doing so, they inevitably gain better
understanding of the decisions and thus are socialized to understand the
meaning of the rules in light of these decisions.
C. The Normalization of the AB’s Extensive Authority: Government,
Private Party, and AB Agency
A central question, however, remains: How does formal design translate
into IC authority in fact? Before the start of the WTO, it was not clear how
Members would use the AB. The Chair of the DSU negotiations stated, “We
thought that things would go on like in the past, evolving around the panel
53
system; nobody expected that the AB would become as active.”
The AB’s authority was established through the normalization (relative to
other domains of international law) of the use of WTO dispute settlement,
including appeals, involving all of the world’s large and emerging economies.
Table 2 and figure 1 summarize the number of claims brought by the fifteen
most frequent WTO complainants, together with their participation as a
respondent, third party, or party to an appeal. Although the table demonstrates
the dominant use of the United States and the EU, it also illustrates the
frequent participation of an array of countries in the development of WTO
jurisprudence. Thailand, for example, has participated in a different panel or
AB proceeding on average every other month (115 proceedings in nineteen
years). Even economically tiny Panama participated in a panel or AB
proceeding more than once a year on average (nineteen in seventeen years).
Normalizing China’s participation by year of membership places it after the
54
United States and the EU.

50. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 8, WTO. Doc WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. Shrimp–Turtle].
51. WTO Members individually criticize AB rulings but have only done so collectively on the
amicus curiae issue, especially following the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle decision.
52. Cosette Creamer & Zuzanna Godzimirska, The Rhetoric of Legitimacy: Mapping Members’
Expressed Views on the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 48 (iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 16,
2015).
53. Interview with Former Chairman of the World Trade Organization Appellate Body, in
Geneva, Switz. (Apr. 30, 2010).
54. Rate for the United States is above two disputes per month since the establishment of the
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Table 2: Participants and Third Participants in Panels and Appeals (1995–
55
2013)
Country

Complainant

Respondent

ThirdParty

Total at
Panel
Level*

Total at
AB
Level*

United
States

106

121

114

341

157

EU

91

77

143

311

137

Canada

33

17

95

145

64

Brazil

26

15

84

125

52

Mexico

23

14

72

109

49

India

21

22

99

142

51

Argentina

20

22

51

93

23

Japan

19

15

143

177

76

Thailand

13

3

69

85

30

S. Korea

16

14

85

115

40

China

12

31

109

152

55

Chile

10

13

38

61

17

New
Zealand

8

–

40

48

22

Australia

7

15

83

105

44

Panama

7

1

8

16

3

WTO. Rate for the EU is 1.85 disputes per month. Rate for China is 1.1 disputes per month. Rate for
Canada is .86 disputes per month.
55. Authors’ calculations based on WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2013 18, 74–93
(2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_e.pdf. Total Panel level is based
on filed cases. Panel reports are counted as having been appealed where they are adopted as upheld,
modified, or reversed by an AB report. The number of panel reports appealed appears lower from
these figures than in actuality because AB proceedings can address more than one panel report.
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Figure 1: Participantts and Third
d Participantts in Panels and Appealss (1995–
56
2013)
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the WTO’s automatic dispute settlement system, and a stake in building its
59
authority. With the automaticity of the adoption of WTO panel and AB
reports, dispute settlement became more certain. As the system legalized, the
financial and professional interests of these actors became more salient.
Lawyers prepared legal briefs that they presented to affected private clients and
to government officials to spur governments to consider filing cases for their
clients. Countries with less legal capacity delegated the drafting of legal briefs
60
and oral argument to these lawyers. In the US–Cotton case, Brazil’s cotton
61
trade association allegedly paid legal fees of around 2,000,000 USD. U.S. and
EU-based multinational firms have paid much more. In the US–EU Aircraft
62
disputes, estimated fees are 1,000,000 USD per month and the disputes have
63
continued for years.
Although only governments have formal access to WTO dispute settlement,
private parties can shop for governments to bring cases when they and the
government have complementary interests. Small developing countries
generally are not well-positioned to bring a case on their own because they lack
legal capacity to recognize violations and advance claims. However,
multinational companies with investments in multiple countries do have this
capacity.
This process is exemplified by the case brought by Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, and Ukraine against Australia regarding
Australia’s labeling law on cigarette packages, in which large U.S. and
64
European tobacco companies had funded law firms to support the lawsuit. The
situation, in practice, is not so different from cases brought by the United States
and the EU. In particular, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Indonesia have
65
real economic stakes due to large tobacco industries and steady exports. Yet
59. In particular, to implement the WTO Agreements, section 301(a) et seq. of the Trade Act of
1974, designed to address foreign unfair practices affecting U.S. exports of goods or services, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2102 (2012), provided a formal mechanism to force U.S. Trade Representatives to take actions before
the WTO. 19 U.S.C § 2411(a) (2012).
60. Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WTO Doc.
WT/DS267/AB/R (adopted Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter US–Cotton].
61. Interview with participating actors, in Geneva, Switz. (July 20, 2005).
62. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted Mar. 23, 2012) [hereinafter US—
Civil Aircraft]. For the newest claims, see United States—Conditional Tax Incentives for Large Civil
Aircraft, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds487_e.htm (last
visited July 12, 2015).
63. See Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why it
Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING
OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 167, 184 (James Hartigan ed., 2009).
64. Sergio Puig, The Merger of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
2, 31 (2015). Recently, the claim brought by Ukraine was suspended. See World Trade Organization,
Communication from fhe Chairperson of the Panel, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging,
WTO Doc. WTO Doc. WT/DS434/16 (June 3, 2015), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/
DDFDocuments/132459/q/WT/DS/434-16.pdf.
65. Id. Yet to the extent developing countries lack internal expertise within their administration to
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the funding provided by the tobacco companies makes it possible for these
smaller countries to use the system as the United States and the EU routinely
do when supported by legal arguments developed by private law firms funded
66
by the private sector. For example, in the EC–Bananas dispute, the United
States was the lead complainant even though it did not export bananas; the
United States brought the case because Chiquita, in particular, had large
investments in Latin America, and Chiquita hired private attorneys to help
67
develop the factual and legal arguments.
WTO disputes retain a political element as reflected in the tendency of titfor-tat suits, in which one case spurs the respondent to look for complaints that
it can bring. Government officials do so to show their domestic political
audience that they are defending the countries’ interests proactively against
foreign trading partners, and to create political costs for the foreign government
as well. Examples of tit-for-tat suits include the aircraft subsidy litigation
68
between Canada and Brazil and the United States and the EU, and the
69
numerous import relief cases between the United States and China. As a result
of these suits, legal wars displace trade wars and, in the process, new legal
constituencies form to build a country’s legal infrastructure to engage in these
battles, as documented for Brazil, India, China, and other developing
70
countries.
The AB has assisted in this process through its rulings. In the EC–Bananas
III dispute, the AB first held that private lawyers could be part of a delegation
before the AB when the small Caribbean island of Saint Lucia sought to include
71
them. In doing so, it helped enhance the sophistication of the legal arguments
made by governments that otherwise have low levels of internal legal capacity,
define a legal position, the private interests are freer to advance their own interests.
66. EC–Bananas, supra note 48, at ¶ 1.
67. See James McCall Smith, Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas
Dispute, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 257, 258
(John S. Odell ed., 2006), http://www.ruig-gian.org/ressources/dupont-Smith.pdf (discussing Chiquita’s
business strategies in the context of the EC–Bananas case).
68. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WTO
Doc. WT/DS46/AB/R (adopted Aug. 20, 1999); US—Civil Aircraft, supra note 62.
69. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS449/R (adopted Mar. 27, 2014); Panel Report, United States—
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China, WTO Doc.
WT/DS422/R (adopted June 8, 2012); Panel Report, China—Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray
Security Inspection Equipment from the European Union, WTO Doc. WT/DS425/R (adopted Feb. 26,
2013); Panel Report, China—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Automobiles from
the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS440/R (adopted May 23, 2014).
70. See, e.g., Gregory C. Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, The Trials of
Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383, 383–485 (2008);
Gregory Shaffer, James Nedumpara & Aseema Sinha, Indian Trade Lawyers and the Building of State
Trade-Related Legal Capacity, 1–2 (Univ. Minn. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-08,
2014); Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, From Paternalism to Paternship: The Development of Trade Law
Capacity in China (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
71. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 979, 994 (2001).
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and made it more feasible for them to participate in the first place. Over time,
lawyers increasingly have become part of developing countries’ delegations, at
first working behind the scenes and later presenting their oral arguments and
72
responding to AB questions. Public–private partnerships among government
authorities, private business, and private lawyers are now common. In the
process, the WTO dispute settlement system has become much more legally and
technically complex. Lawyers now frequently make procedural challenges
giving rise to new jurisprudence, recursively increasing the need for lawyers.
AB members also had their own interest in consolidating the AB’s
authority. Understanding the context of the WTO dispute settlement system
thus also requires an understanding of the institutional interests and actions of
the AB. The first group of AB members was aware of the powerful instrument
given to the AB. One candidate to the AB discussed this matter with WTO
Ambassadors in 1995 during the selection procedure. He remembered that “We
were asked about the approach the AB should take . . . . I told them that the
AB was a slender tender plant that should be protected from too strong winds;
the AB should act cautiously . . . . I think the Ambassadors probably liked
73
that.”
Another AB Member recalled, “We were aware that we represented the
instance of last resort. This was an enormous responsibility; we did not intend to
74
handle this with levity.” Once selected, the first AB members wrote their own
rules of procedure, because the DSU was silent on many issues. One AB
Member recalled that this exercise was important for team building and created
75
a strong sense of collegiality. The rules of procedure also facilitated the
development of a more court-like system.
This first group of AB members was careful to construct its authority when
interpreting WTO substantive rules that at times could be vague and openended. The AB’s rulings abandoned the use of diplomatic language aimed at
“dispute settlement” in favor of applying the interpretive norms set forth in the
76
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The AB often adopted a technical,
formalistic, and text-based approach, frequently citing dictionaries to support its
77
reasoning. It routinely and at times harshly overruled panels for deficiencies in
72. Discussions with private attorneys representing countries in WTO dispute settlement, as well
as members of the WTO Secretariat, in Geneva, Switzerland.
73. Interview with a candidate to the WTO Appellate Body, telephone interview (July 6, 2010).
74. Interview with a WTO Appellate Body Member, telephone interview (June 4, 2010).
75. Id.
76. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980); P. J. Kuijper, The Law of GATT as Special Field of International Law:
Ignorance, further refinement or self-contained system of international law?, 25 NETHERLANDS Y.B.
INT’L L. 227, 229–232 (1994); see generally Pauwelyn Joost & Manfred Elsig, The Politics of Treaty
Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across International Tribunals, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE
ART (J. Dunoff & M. Pollack eds., 2013) (discussing how international tribunals actually implement
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rules).
77. See Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52
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their legal reasoning or their application of treaty interpretation techniques. In
the process, it further empowered the WTO legal secretariat that services ad
hoc panels, which are still often composed of diplomats: the secretariat holds
the reservoir of knowledge of WTO dispute settlement whose technical
79
complexity is growing. The diplomats chosen for panels, in turn, increasingly
80
have a legal background. This turn to formalistic legal reasoning can insulate
the AB from challenge by making law appear to be more autonomous. It
narrows the audience having the capacity to critique WTO jurisprudence, and it
further empowers a narrow community of practitioners, scholars, and
81
government officials with technical knowledge—the WTO legal field.
The AB has also consolidated its authority by striving for consensus among
its members and by exercising restraint in issuing concurrences or dissents.
Early on, AB members decided to discuss all cases collegially, even though the
82
DSU provides that only three members would be the authors of a report. This
practice continues today. Both panel and AB members appear to go to great
pains to present the appearance of unanimity—even where unanimity does not
actually exist. At the panel level, there were only thirteen individual opinions
and seven dissents out of the first 196 cases (constituting 3.3 percent of the 392
83
opportunities for a separate opinion; and 1.7 percent for a dissent). At the AB
level, there were only six separate opinions and two dissents in 119 AB reports
(constituting 2.5 percent of the 238 opportunities for a separate opinion; and 1.7
84
percent for a dissent). As James Bacchus, former Chairman of the Appellate
Body, explained,
Whatever our individual role may be in any particular appeal, each of us strives always
to reach a ‘consensus’ in every appeal. We are not required to do so. The treaty does
not prohibit dissents . . . , the ‘consensus’ we have achieved in the many appeals that

VA. J. INT’L L. 103, 115 (2011) (“A search of the first ninety-six rulings of the Appellate Body found
that a dictionary was cited in sixty-seven decisions regarding the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a term
(constituting 70% of these Appellate Body rulings).”).
78. The Appellate Body modifies or reverses portions of around 85% of panel reports. Michel
Cartland, Gérard Depayre & Jan Woznowski, Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute
Settlement?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 979, 987, 989 (2012).
79. Weiler, supra note 17, at 205–06.
80. Jose Augusto Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: The
Creation of International Legal Fields 14–16 (Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832382.
81. See generally Sol Picciotto, The WTO’s Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of
Global Governance, 18 GOVERNANCE 477 (2005) (describing the legalization of the AB through its
interpretive techniques).
82. DSU, supra note 8, art. XVII, ¶ 1; see also Ehlermann, supra note 49, at 477 (describing the
system of exchange of views among all seven Appellate Body members).
83. Calculation by authors. Information on dissents is available at WORLDTRADELAW.NET,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
84. Id. In contrast, dissents and separate opinions are a common practice before the International
Court of Justice as well as investor–state tribunals. For an excellent analysis, see Jeffrey Dunoff &
Mark Pollack, International Judicial Dissent: Causes and Consequences (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author), https://eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/84.
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have 85
been made, thus far, to the Appellate Body has not always been achieved
easily.

Even where there are separate opinions, DSU Articles 14.3 and 17.1 require
86
them to be anonymous. Were the practice otherwise, the hermeneutic power
of the AB could be reduced because opinions would more easily be identified
with individual AB members. By wrapping their rulings in textual and technical
reasoning and consensus decisions, the AB members enhance their authority as
upholders of the law.
The AB has also exercised agency to enhance its authority by directing its
decisions toward administrative bodies instead of legislatures. In a number of
87
cases, with the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle case and the EU–GMO cases being notable
examples, the AB and panels respectively found that, although the U.S. and EU
legislation did not violate WTO rules, the U.S. and EU regulatory practices did.
Thus, to comply, the United States and EU did not need to go back to their
legislatures to change the law, but could instead come into compliance through
revising their administrative practices. Similarly, in the US–Section 301 Trade
88
Act case, the panel found that U.S. statements and administrative practice
demonstrated provisionally that the U.S. Section 301 did not need to be revised
so long as the United States administered its law in compliance with DSU
89
Article 23, which prohibits unilateral action outside of DSU procedures.
To establish extensive authority, the AB not only had to earn the trust of
WTO Members, but it also had to face systemic challenges from civil society.
The mass anti-globalization protests against the WTO—starting with the 1999
90
WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle—often singled out AB decisions. The AB
responded to those challenges in a number of ways.
First, the AB accepts amicus briefs from any nongovernmental organization,
provided that the brief meets certain criteria. When the AB wrote formal
criteria it was severely criticized by the WTO membership for failing to adhere
to the DSU (with only the United States supporting it), but the AB’s continuing
acceptance of amicus briefs evidences AB’s support for this practice. Even
though the AB has never formally referenced amicus briefs in its decisions,
interviewees state that the AB reads them and thus is subject to the persuasive
91
force they might have.
Second, although WTO rules provide that AB hearings are to be
85. James Bacchus, Table Talk: Around the Table of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1021, 1029–30 (2002).
86. See DSU, supra note 8, art. XIV, ¶ 3 , art. XVII, ¶ 1.
87. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, ¶¶ 8.4–8.10, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / WT/DS293/R (adopted Nov.
21, 2006).
88. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc.
WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2000).
89. DSU, supra note 8, art. XXIII.
90. See Michael J. Trebilcoc, Critiquing the Critics of Economic Globalization, 1 J. INT’L L. &
INT’L REL. 213, 213 n.2 (2004–2005) (citing newspaper articles).
91. Discussions with former members of the AB secretariat and AB members over time.
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92

confidential, the panels and the AB have opened them to the public when the
litigants agree. So far, a small but increasing group of Members, including the
United States, EU, Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Japan, Ecuador, Brazil,
and Mexico, have agreed to open hearings so that the general public can watch
them by closed-circuit television. This practice once more makes the
proceedings appear to be more transparent and legalistic and thus (potentially)
less objectionable. It also broadens knowledge of WTO proceedings among
non-state actors.
Third, the AB has interpreted WTO rules in a manner that is much more
sensitive to environmental and public morals defenses than earlier GATT
93
panels. In this way, the AB’s modified approach to defenses has defused some
of the public critique of nongovernmental actors against WTO rulings being
biased in favor of trade concerns over regulatory ones.
A number of WTO Members have complemented these actions by making
their submissions to panels and the AB publicly available. Some WTO
members, such as the United States, the EU, and Canada, make their
submissions public as a matter of policy. Others such as Brazil and Mexico
94
publish submissions on a case-by-case basis. Such actions place greater
pressure on other governments to create formal and informal mechanisms to
make government decisionmaking in WTO dispute settlement more
95
transparent to affected stakeholders. Brazil, for example, was among the
strongest critics of the AB decision to accept amicus briefs in the U.S. Shrimp–
96
Turtle case, but Brazil then decided to attach an amicus brief of a group of
97
NGOs to support its defense in the Brazil–Tyres case, a dispute involving
measures that affected the export of retreaded tyres from the EU to Brazil.
Brazil’s defense was successful on the basis of environmental and health
98
protection arguments, and the country has subsequently made its filings
publicly available.

92. DSU, supra note 8, art. XVII, ¶ 9.
93. See Report of the Panel, GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
DS29/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT BISD (39th Supp.), para. 5.8-5.14; Appellate Body Report, United
States—Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of DSU by
Malasya, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Nov.. 21, 2001) paras. 124-131; see also Robert
Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and
Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491, 503, 505 (2002) (discussing Shrimp–Turtle dispute)
94. The United States and the EU aim to make their submissions public as they give them to the
panel. Canada makes them public after the dispute is over. Mexico’s practice is case-by-case and has
been changing, including in relation to the practices of its opponent. This is confirmed by e-mails with a
representative of each country. See Gabrielle Marceau & Mikella Hurley, Transparency and Public
Participation in the WTO: A Report Card on WTO Transparency Mechanisms 4 TRADE L. & DEV. 19,
26 (2012).
95. See, e.g., Shaffer, Nedumpara & Sinha, supra note 70; Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra
note 70.
96. U.S. Shrimp–Turtle, supra note 50.
97. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc.
WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007).
98. Id. at ¶ 258.
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IV
INDICATORS OF NARROW, INTERMEDIATE, AND EXTENSIVE AB AUTHORITY
The AB very rapidly consolidated extensive (field-level) authority that
incorporates narrow (litigant-specific) and intermediate (member-level)
authority, which is unique in international politics at the multilateral level. This
part presents specific indicators of this development.
The use of the WTO dispute settlement system quickly became increasingly
normalized compared to GATT dispute settlement. Formal complaints and
formal panel and AB decisions are much more frequent. The fact that a much
wider array of parties brings complaints and more parties are respondents to
complaints means that even if the AB were to have only narrow, litigantspecific authority, many more countries would still be affected. Overall, sixty-six
WTO Members have been a party to a WTO dispute (as a complainant or
respondent) and another thirty-five Members have been a third party, such that,
in total, 101 Members have participated as a party or third party in WTO
99
dispute settlement. This constitutes, to our knowledge, the broadest use of any
IC by states ever and is an indicator of the AB’s extensive authority in the field.
To help overcome the challenges for developing countries, a group of WTO
Members funded the creation of an Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL) in
2001, which offers free legal advice and subsidized assistance in dispute
settlement proceedings. Since its creation, the ACWL, when acting on behalf of
developing countries, has been the third most active complainant within the
WTO dispute settlement system, after the United States and the EU, providing
support in forty-four WTO dispute settlement proceedings, which constitutes
100
around one-fifth of proceedings initiated since 2001. Since 2000, developing
countries—the beneficiaries of the ACWL—have brought nearly 50% of WTO
101
cases.
Policy changes, whether involving compliance, or in the alternative a
settlement more favorable to the complainant than the status quo, are a second
important indicator of litigant-specific authority. They are difficult to measure,
102
but WTO compliance rates, at least formally, appear to be high for an IC.
Complainants sought compliance actions (pursuant to DSU Article 21.5
proceedings) in only twenty-seven of the first 104 decisions (constituting 25%)
and sought retaliation authorization in only nineteen cases (just 18%) through
99. Authors’ calculation based on WTO data, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_
by_country_e.htm (as of end of 2014).
100. E-mail from member of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, to Gregory Shaffer, Chancellor’s
Professor, Irvine School of Law (May 7, 2014) (on file with author).
101. Authors’ calculation based on WTO data, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_status_e.htm (as of end of 2013).
102. Bruce Wilson, former director of the WTO Legal Secretariat, found the following: “In virtually
all of these cases the WTO Member found to be in violation has indicated its intention to bring itself
into compliance and the record indicates that in most cases has already done so.” Bruce Wilson,
Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10
J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 397 (2007).
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103

2013. When Members sought retaliation, they eventually reached legal
settlement in a large number of these cases. Such legal settlement involved
acceptance of the retaliation; steps taken toward expanding market access, as in
104
105
the EC–Bananas III case and EC–Meat Hormones case; or the provision of
106
other compensatory benefits, such as in the US–Cotton and US–Clove
107
Cigarettes cases. Moreover, if the AB exercised no narrow authority that led
to some meaningful policy change, it is doubtful that such a broad array of
WTO Members would use the system.
The AB has gained much more than narrow authority to help resolve ad hoc
disputes between litigating Members. It has created a jurisprudence that WTO
Members engaged in substantial trade realize they must understand and
attempt to shape because that jurisprudence has future implications for their
trading interests. Members’ participation as third parties in adjudications before
the AB indicates this awareness of WTO jurisprudence’s importance for policy
choices. Indeed, there would be no reason for Members to join as third parties
if they had no systemic concerns that such decisions would matter for future
cases and thus for assessing domestic policy options. The United States has
been, in practice, a party or third party in every case that resulted in a panel or
108
AB decision. The EU has been a party or third party in over 94% of such
109
decisions. In the WTO’s early days, the United States and the EU stood out as
frequent third-party participants. Soon, however, other countries recognized the
importance of third-party participation. China, India, and Brazil, for example,
were a third party in 109, 100, and 84 cases respectively, and 83 WTO Members
110
have been a third party in at least one case. In contrast, thirty-two GATT
Contracting Parties have acted as a third party in a GATT dispute during the
111
GATT’s forty-eight-year history.
Once again, the AB exercised agency in facilitating such third-party

103. Authors’ calculations based on information on article 22.6 proceedings, http://www.worldtrade
law.net/databases/suspensionawards.php.
104. EC–Bananas, supra note 48 ¶ 129.
105. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶
246, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R / WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998); Appellate Body Report,
United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute, ¶ 116, WTO Doc.
WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted Oct. 16, 2008).
106. US–Cotton, supra note 60, ¶ 258.
107. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove
Cigarettes, ¶ 83, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012).
108. See Adopted Panel Reports within the Framework of GATT 1947, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm (last visited May, 21 2014) (listing all
publicly available GATT panel reports). For the odd instance in which the United States was a party in
a case rather than a third party in a separate case, such as in the multiple cases regarding EC–Bananas,
we count the United States as a participant because otherwise the figures would misleadingly suggest
that the United States was not engaged with the WTO case.
109. Id.
110. Id. (based on information available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_
dispu_documents_e.htm (as of 2014)).
111. Id. (based on review of all adopted GATT panel reports).
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participation. DSU Article 10 provides that a WTO member can be a third
party, pursuant to which it can “be heard by the panel and . . . make written
submissions to the panel,” when it has “a substantial interest in a matter before
112
a panel.” The AB has interpreted this provision liberally and, in the EC–
113
Sardines case, even let Morocco exercise de facto third-party-type rights by
filing an amicus curiae brief when Morocco had failed to reserve its third-party
114
rights before the panel. In doing so, the AB has facilitated an increase in
Member engagement and broadened the range of arguments and perspectives
that it hears.
Recognizing the implications of WTO law, Members have significantly
increased the size of their delegations in Geneva from an average of less than
three representatives per Member in 1982 to an average of just under six
representatives per Member in 2009, as shown in Figure 2. Many Members have
established specialized trade law divisions or hired internal legal counselors for
115
the first time. These delegations’ legal counselors regularly attend discussions
regarding WTO case law. In Geneva, the ACWL, Sidley Austin LLP, and the
NGO International Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development each
regularly organizes meetings to analyze AB decisions. In addition, several
governments including Brazil, China, and India have organized and participated
116
in discussion groups domestically.

112. DSU, supra note 8, art. X.
113. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 161–62,
WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R(adopted Oct. 23, 2002).
114. Panel Report, EC—Trade Description of Sardines (Peru), WT/DS231 (adopted May 29, 2002);
see also James McCall Smith, WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of Procedure in Appellate Body
Rulings, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 65, 80 (2003).
115. See generally DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO: THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY
EXPERIENCE (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz eds., 2008) (providing case studies of
developing countries).
116. See, e.g., Shaffer, Ratton Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 70, at 392; Shaffer, Nedumpara &
Sinha, supra note 70, at 13.
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law. Although AB decisions have no formal stare decisis effect, panel and AB
reports regularly cite prior panel and AB decisions. In the EC–Seal Products
dispute, for example, the AB cited sixty-seven former panel and AB decisions
120
to support its interpretation of WTO texts. Joost Pauwelyn finds that 35.4% of
AB decisions cross-reference each other, thus forming a “large and dense” body
121
of precedent. A clear and functioning hierarchy can be deduced from panels’
recurrent following of AB decisions. Following previously adopted AB reports
addressing the same issues promotes a coherent and predictable body of
jurisprudence. In only one case, involving the controversial use of an
administrative practice known as zeroing by the United States in antidumping
procedures, did the AB find it necessary to reprimand a panel for failing to
122
follow previous AB jurisprudence. Panels have fallen in line and regularly cite
AB jurisprudence in support of their decisions.
Complainants and respondents, in turn, know they must cite AB
jurisprudence in their submissions to support their legal arguments. The
submissions of several members such as the United States, the EU, Brazil,
Australia, Japan, and Mexico are publicly available, and they are full of
citations to AB reports. Twenty randomly chosen submissions, including
submissions prepared by the ACWL, cite a median of seventeen and one-half
and an average of twenty-one separate panel and AB decisions. Moreover,
private parties cite to AB jurisprudence as well when they attempt to persuade
governments to bring a WTO case, writing sample briefs that a government can
123
adopt wholesale or from which the government can cut and paste. Private
parties at times write amicus curiae briefs for which our random checks of the
rate of citations showed no significant difference with the citation rate in party
124
briefs.
Parties’ strategic bringing of cases to shape WTO jurisprudence provides
another indicator of the AB’s intermediate authority. In many cases,
complainants have targeted countries with smaller markets as a way to build
125
precedent for future cases that involve larger economic claims. Similarly, a
120. Based on authors’ calculations.
121. Joost Pauwelyn, Minority Rules: Precedent and Participation Before the WTO Appellate Body,
in JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Joanna Jemielniak, Laura Nielsen &
Henrik Palmer Olsen eds., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2474611. To see the use of AB citations as a network of decisions, this link provides access
to a resource prepared by the authors: http://weboflaw.com/WTO/index.html?config=not-unified.json#.
122. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from
Mexico, ¶¶ 62–68, WTO Doc.WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted Apr. 30, 2008). In zeroing, the United States
sets at zero the negative differences between the prices of a product when compared to its U.S. import
prices. Because negative amounts are excluded, this practice often results in the calculation of a margin
and an antidumping duty in excess of the actual dumping.
123. Shaffer, supra note 58, at 49.
124. To review the full text of selected amicus curiae briefs submitted in ongoing and past WTO
dispute settlement proceedings, see WTO Amicus Submissions, WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/static.php?type=public&page=amicus.
125. Krzysztof J. Pelc, The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network
Application—ERRATUM, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 547, 548 (2014).

SHAFFER_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2016]

AUTHORITY OF THE WTO APPELLATE BODY

1/28/2016 4:28 PM

261

large subset of WTO cases involves a small amount of affected trade that alone
126
would not justify the costs of litigating the case. One explanation for these
127
cases is that the complainant wishes to set precedent for future disputes, thus
implicitly recognizing that the AB wields more than narrow, case-specific
authority.
The AB’s interpretations of WTO texts have become part of the WTO
acquis and, in practice, are authoritative for future disputes. They thus can
inform settlements in the shadow of the law. A particularly telling indicator of
the AB’s intermediate and extensive authority is where countries modify
contemplated legislation or regulation without a dispute ever being brought.
One practicing attorney stated that “nineteen of every twenty client matters
involving WTO legal issues never lead to formal WTO claims, and the clear
128
majority of them settle favorably.” For example, following other countries’
public complaints referencing WTO rules, the Obama Administration revised
its signature American Recovery and Reinvestment Act during the height of
129
the financial crisis,
pursuant to which it had designed government
procurement regulation to increase domestic employment by favoring domestic
products.
Although the above indicators suggest that the AB has attained at least
intermediate authority, the AB almost immediately established extensive fieldlevel authority as well, reaching deep within state institutions and affecting
perceptions of a broad array of actors regarding the existence of a field of law.
As a result, AB decisions have broad implications for domestic institutions,
130
professions, and governing norms.
The pressure to constrain domestic regulation in light of AB interpretations
of WTO rules is not just external, but also can come internally because nationstates are not monolithic entities, but rather consist of rival factions, some of
which use WTO rules as leverage to advance their policy agendas. These actors
within nation-states can be viewed as “trusty buddies” of the WTO when their
131
interests align with trade liberalization; they mediate the global and the local.
Nation-states’ trade agencies interact with other agencies, and they can act as
the overseers of not only foreign compliance with WTO rules, but also with
domestic compliance so as to avoid WTO disputes. The U.S. Trade
126. See Chad Bown & Kara Reynolds, Trade Flows and Trade Disputes 2 (World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 6979, July 2014), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/07/
19894128/trade-flows-trade-disputes.
127. Professor Puig has also documented how these WTO decisions set precedents that may be
persuasive to, and adopted by, tribunals outside the WTO context. Puig, supra note 64, at 37.
128. Interview with private attorney in WTO practice, by telephone (July 11, 2014).
129. Will Government Bailouts Lead to Trade Wars?, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE, INT’L INST.
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.iisd.org/gsi/news/will-government-bailouts-leadtrade-wars.
130. Shaffer has elsewhere assessed the broad implications of the WTO for domestic institutions,
professions, and governing norms. Gregory Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9
REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 1 (2014), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12057/abstract.
131. Id. at 5.
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Representative plays this role in the United States, the European Commission
in Europe, and the Indian Department of Commerce and Industry in India. The
agencies respond to export-oriented interests catalyzed by WTO law. These
agencies and export-oriented businesses and trade associations indirectly
132
become allies of the WTO system.
This enrollment of domestic public and private actors affects politics in
smaller developing countries as well. For example, the ACWL was created to
assist developing countries in WTO disputes, and it has issued over 1,800 legal
opinions on WTO law to developing countries since 2001; around 71% of these
133
opinions were issued to its lower income (Category C) Members. Yet about
one-third of its legal opinions concern the WTO compliance of the requesting
country’s own internal measures and proposed measures, exemplifying a
mechanism through which awareness of WTO law diffuses so as to induce
134
Member compliance and avoid disputes.
Even in jurisdictions that do not grant WTO jurisprudence direct effect,
national judges increasingly are aware of such jurisprudence and arguably
attempt to conform to it when such an interpretation is permissible under
national law. Indian courts, for example, have referred to WTO law in
developing their antidumping jurisprudence even though India is a dualist
135
jurisdiction. The Mexican Supreme Court has similarly used WTO–AB
decisions to assess the consistency of Mexican law with its international
136
obligations. A U.S. Court of International Trade judge shared that the Court’s
judges always read WTO jurisprudence that implicates decisions within their
137
jurisdiction even though their decisions must rely on U.S. law.
Citations by other ICs provide yet another indicator of extensive AB
authority. In recent years, regionalism or the adoption of preferential trade
agreements have added a new layer to international trade law. All members of
the WTO are parties (or scheduled to become parties) to at least one of the

132. See NITSAV CHOREV, REMAKING U.S. TRADE POLICY: FROM PROTECTIONISM TO
GLOBALIZATION 191 (2007); Helen V. Milner, The Political Economy of International Trade, 2 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 91, 95, 97 (1999) (discussing changes in trade policy preferences for domestic actors,
including political leaders).
133. Gregory Shaffer, Assessing the ACWL from a Broader Governance Perspective 3 (Minn. Legal
Studies Research, Paper No. 11-46, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966251.
134. Id.
135. Madhurendra Nath Jha, India: A Three-Tier Judicial Review System, in DOMESTIC JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF TRADE REMEDIES: EXPERIENCES OF THE MOST ACTIVE WTO MEMBERS 287, 288–89
(Müslüm Yilmaz ed., 2013). A dualist jurisdiction is one in which the international and national legal
planes are distinct so that international law only imposes obligations in interstate relations and should
not be directly applied by national courts.
136. See, e.g., Comercio Exterior. El decreto publicado en el diario oficial de la federacion el 17 de
agosto de 2005, que impone temporalmente una cuota arancelaria del 20% a algunos bienes originarios
de los Estados Unidos de America, es constitucional, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion [SCJN],
Semanario Judicial de la Federacion y su Gaceta, Novena Epoca, Tomo XXVI, Septiembre de 2007,
Tesis 1a CLXXXIX/2007, Pagina 376 (Mex.) (referencing theUS—Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)),
https://www.scjn.gob.mx/libreria/Decima2013Docs/XVII_FEB.pdf.
137. Discussion with member of U.S. Court of International Trade, New York, NY (Oct. 2013).
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more than 400 preferential trade agreements. These agreements in theory
could weaken AB authority, but in fact, such trade agreement dispute
settlement systems are infrequently used and when they are, adjudicators in
charge of deciding disputes often rely on the interpretation in WTO law of
similarly worded terms. Preferential trade agreement adjudicators’ citation to
and common interpretation of terms such as “like products” and “less
139
favourable [treatment]” reveal the influence of AB jurisprudence. Parties to
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, tend to
litigate matters in the WTO when they have a choice, in part because it is much
easier to stall and block the formation of a NAFTA panel. But when panels are
formed, they cite WTO law, as in the Mexico–U.S. Cross-Border Trucking
140
141
dispute and the U.S.–Canada Softwood Lumber dispute. Similarly, investor–
state tribunals, operating under bilateral investment treaties, cited WTO
142
jurisprudence forty-one times between 2000 and 2013.
Beyond courts, knowledge of WTO law as a field has developed significantly
around the world; this growth of knowledge can facilitate the internalization of
WTO law within nation-states so that it shapes normative understandings. For
example, think tanks with specialists on international trade law have sprouted
in developed countries and larger emerging economies. In 2010, the WTO
launched a new WTO Chairs Program to support research and outreach in
developing countries. It initially launched Chairs in fourteen different
143
developing countries and seven new ones were added in 2014. The WTO also
offers internships in Geneva, online courses and occasional seminars, as does
the ACWL. Thousands of people from around the world have participated in
138. See Andreas Dür, Leonardo Baccini & Manfred Elsig, The Design of International Trade
Agreements: Introducing a New Database, 9 REV. INT’L ORGS. 353, 357 (2014) (noting that “with the
exception of Mongolia, all but a few tiny (island) countries have signed at least one PTA since World
War II”). Design of Trade Agreements Database, a collaborative effort mapping international trade
agreements and exploring causes and effects, has identified more than 600 agreements. See DESIGN OF
TRADE AGREEMENTS DATABASE, http://www.designoftradeagreements.org/ (last visited July 12,
2015).
139. See Gabrielle Marceau, Arnau Izaguerri & Vladyslav Lanovoy, The WTO’s Influence on Other
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: A Lighthouse in the Storm of Fragmentation, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 481,
516, 519 (2013).
140. In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Final Affirmative Antidumping Determination, Secretariat File No. USA-CDA-2002-1904-02, Decision of the Panel Following
Remand, ¶ 2 (NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel Jun. 9, 2005).
141. In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File No. USA-Mex-98-2008-01,
Final Report of the Panel, ¶ 214 (North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 20
Arbital Panel Feb. 6, 2001); cf. Sergio Puig, International Regime Complexity and Economic Law
Enforcement, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 491, 491–516 (2014) (presenting strategies to be used by
policymakers in combatting political maneuvering by states through procedural tactics).
142. Based on authors’ calculations. See also INVESTOR-STATE LAW GUIDE, http://www.investor
statelawguide.com/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2015) (documenting decisions by investor–state tribunals).
143. In addition, as of 2013, the WTO was supporting 107 WTO Reference Centers that house
WTO-related documentation in developing countries, including through CD-ROMs and internet
support. See Reference Centres Programme, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/devel_e/train_e/ref_centres_e.htm (last visited July 13, 2015) (providing resources and contact
details).
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them.
Additionally, basic knowledge of WTO law has developed within sections of
the private bar in many countries. This knowledge can be used not only to
engage in WTO dispute settlement, but also in domestic policy deliberations
and in domestic trade litigation. Brazil, India, and China, for example, have
worked to facilitate the development of such private expertise in order to
diffuse WTO law-related capacity. The private bar, in particular, has
proliferated to serve clients on import relief matters permitted under WTO
145
law—that is, antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguards cases. From
1994 through 2012, India initiated 667 antidumping investigations, Argentina
146
engaged in 352 investigations, and Brazil conducted 339 investigations.
Overall, developed country G20 members imposed antidumping measures that,
between 1993 and 2009, affected around 1,200 to 2,000 product lines each year,
reaching a peak in 2002. Developing country G20 members’ activity steadily
rose from close to zero measures in 1994 to around 600 in 2000, 1,200 in 2004,
147
and 1,600 in 2009. By 2011, developing country G20 members imposed a
greater share of these measures against imports from other emerging economies
than from high-income economies, a trend that applies not only to imports from
148
China but to imports generally from emerging economies.
As developing countries have adopted, developed, and used these forms of
149
import relief laws, the domestic profession has grown. This professional work
can provide an entry point into WTO work, since around 50% of WTO cases
since 2005 have been import relief cases. Out of the 123 Panel reports appealed
between 1995 and 2013, around 48% of them invoked the WTO antidumping,

144. Authors’ calculation based on Training News Archive, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/train_arc_e.htm. The WTO hired around seventy to
eighty interns per year from 2007 through 2013. In addition, the WTO online training lists over 1,000
people. WTO online courses attract more than a thousand developing-country participants, WORLD
TRADE ORG., (Jan. 19, 2009), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/etraining_19jan09_e.htm.
For a list of programs organized by the WTO, see Training News Archive, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/train_arc_e.htm.. For the programs provided by the
ACWL, see Annual Training Course, Advisory Center on WTO Law, http://www.acwl
.ch/e/training/annual_training_course.html.
145. The WTO provides for three forms of import relief: antidumping law for when products have
been sold at less than fair value); countervailing-duty law for when products have been subsidized, and
safeguard measures for when a domestic industry faces serious injury caused by a substantial increase
in imports. ANDREW GUZMAN AND JOOST PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 453–519 (2d
ed. 2012).
146. Chad P. Bown, Global Antidumping Database, THE WORLD BANK (June 2015),
http://go.worldbank.org/KR19BT5EQ0.
147. Chad P. Bown, Taking Stock of Antidumping, Safeguards and Countervailing Duties, 1990–
2009, 34 THE WORLD ECON. 1955, 1978–79 (2011).
148. Chad P. Bown, Emerging Economies and the Emergence of South–South Protectionism, 47 J.
WORLD TRADE 1, 3–30 (2013).
149. Cf. Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3–4 (2012)
(discussing the growth of antidumping measures imposed by India and China, accompanied by a
subsequent growth in proceedings).
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subsidies, or safeguards agreements.
The development of WTO law as a field of academic study provides another
indicator of the rise of extensive AB authority. The more investments made
into institutions, firms, and careers related to WTO law, the more authoritative
that WTO law—and the AB’s place in clarifying its meaning—can potentially
become. A growing number of English language casebooks on GATT and
151
WTO law are in circulation, from only one in the 1970s to around a dozen
today. In the United States alone, 106 law professors in the American
Association of Law Schools listed themselves as teaching (or having taught) an
152
international trade law-related class in 2011.
This expansion has been
complemented by a growing European Law Students’ Association Moot Court
Competition on WTO law that in its most recent and twelfth edition attracted
153
more than 100 teams from all over the world.
Scholars form part of the broader epistemic trade law community that, in
aiming to influence interpretation, also help to solidify it as a legal field. Today,
an interpretive community assesses and criticizes the reasoning of panel and AB
decisions. Figure 3 shows the increase in articles written on WTO law over time
as listed in the U.S. Westlaw law review database, with a significant increase in
the second half of the 1990s, peaking in 2006. Similarly, the number of journals
dedicated to international trade law has increased to at least around twenty154
five. The diffusion of this knowledge of WTO law facilitates the acceptance of
AB authority among a broader, although specialized, community—the trade
law field.

150. Authors’
own
compilation
based
on
data
from WORLDTRADELAW.NET,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
151. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1977).
152. Authors’ calculations based on ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW
TEACHERS 2011–2012, (2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/aals-directory-of-law-teachers2011-12.pdf.
153. See ELSA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, http://elsamootcourt.elsa.org/; Corrina Muckenheim,
Reaching Out to the World: The ELSA Moot Court Competition on WTO Law in Annex: ELSA Moot
Court Competition (EMC2) at 464.
154. For example, the Journal of International Economic Law was established in 2006, and the
World Trade Review was first published in 2008, each complementing the earlier Journal of World
Trade, established in 1967. Additionally, new journals are being published in countries of emerging
economies, such as Trade, Law and Development in India, established 2008, and the Asian Journal of
WTO and International Health Law and Policy in Taiwan, first published in 2006. For a list of
international trade law journals, see Journal Links, WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http://www.worldtrade
law.net/static.php?type=public&page=journals (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
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Most broadly, WTO cases are covered to a much greater extent in world
media than were GATT cases, helping to embed this jurisprudence as a field of
law. WTO panel and AB decisionmaking is at times in the spotlight of
international media on account of late-1990s civil society protests against the
WTO and the ongoing politics of trade relations. The careful language used by
panels and the AB in cases involving environmental and health issues, in which
they stress the importance of environmental and health regulation, is targeted
at these broader audiences. Government officials realize the importance of the
audience of WTO cases. For example, a U.S. representative in the US–Cotton
case brought by Brazil—a dispute involving subsidies provided to U.S.
producers, users, and exporters of upland cotton—stated that “he had not fully
realized that he was about to lose the case until his wife told him ‘that she read
about the case in the New York Times! (. . .) at that stage I knew we would lose
156
the case.” Similarly, in the 2006 Brazilian Presidential campaign, “the two
main candidates argued tirelessly about which party (the Workers’ Party or
157
Social Democratic Party) won more claims at the WTO.”

155. The authors’ methodology of the figure, which depicts articles published per year, was as
follows: The search was conducted in Westlaw’s database of law reviews and journals on May 21, 2014
using the search terms (1) date(year) and (2) atleast10(wto or gatt), which requires at least 10
occurrences of the term “wto” or “gatt.”
156. Manfred Elsig & Philipp Stucki, Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why
Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?, 19 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 292, 310 (2012).
157. Welber Barral, UNITED NATIONS, THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 8
n.1 (2007), http://www.cepal.org/en/publications/brazilian-experience-dispute-settlement (citing
Carolina Glycerio, Política Externa Gera Embate Acalorado Entre Lula e Alckmin, BBCBRASIL.COM,
Oct. 9, 2006, http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2006/10/061009_debatepoliticaextern
acg.shtml.
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that restrict trade in a similar amount, the AB’s authority is undermined and
Members and affected private actors can lose faith in the reliability of the
system. Some believe that with the length of the proceedings, the increasing use
of delay tactics, and the limitations on retrospective remedies, AB rulings do
little to dissuade large countries like the United States and China from
159
advancing policies that are contrary to WTO rules.
There are limits to states’ willingness to comply with AB rulings and those
limits can affect the politics of AB interpretation, constraining the AB’s
autonomy and power to change behavior. In rare cases, both the complainant
and the respondent may question a decision because of its systemic
implications. This occurred most notably in the Australia–Automotive Leather
160
case. The United States won the case involving Australian subsidies to
automotive leather producers and the panel issued a recommendation that
Australia not only remove the subsidies, but that the recipient pay them back to
161
the Australian government. Even though it won the case, the United States
disagreed with this aspect of the ruling because it opposed the application of
retrospective remedies in antidumping and subsidies cases, which could also be
162
applied against the United States. No WTO panel or AB decision has since
recommended any retrospective remedies, even though WTO rules are not
clear on this issue, and even though weak remedies are a weak link in the
system’s effectiveness. The rebuke, which was supported by other WTO
Members, appears to have effectively constrained the authority of the AB in
interpreting WTO rules to provide for stronger remedies.
The potential response of parties to a panel or AB decision can shape these
decisions, so that the AB’s authority is always constrained by its immediate as
well as its broader audience. As noted earlier, in many cases, the WTO panel or
the AB found that a country’s administrative practice, not its underlying
163
national law, was WTO-inconsistent. These findings facilitate compliance.
More broadly, compliance appears to be more challenging in cases involving
164
regulatory policies that implicate environmental protection and social welfare.
159. Mark Wu, A Free Pass for China, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
04/03/opinion/a-free-pass-for-china.html. These concerns of course, are hardly unique to the WTO. See
generally Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach 106
AM. J. INT’L L. 225 (2012) (discussing the relatively low prospects of success in WTO litigation).
160. Panel Report, Australia—Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive
Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS126/RW (adopted Jan. 21, 2000).
161. Id.
162. See World Trade Organization, Minutes of Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of
March 7, 2000, WTO Doc. WT/DS/M/75(2000) (“The United States did not agree with every word of
the Panel Report. The Panel's remedy went beyond that sought by the United States.”).
163. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶¶ 7.53–7.54,
WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Dec. 22, 1999). See generally Sharif Bhuiyan, Mandatory and
Discretionary Legislation under the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 571 (2002) (discussing the distinction
between discretionary and mandatory legislation within the WTO context).
164. See Thomas Sattler, Gabriele Spilker & Thomas Bernauer, Does WTO Dispute Settlement
Enforce or Inform?, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 877, 877 (2014) (finding empirical support for the argument
that WTO dispute settlement primarily serves as an enforcement device).

SHAFFER_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2016]

AUTHORITY OF THE WTO APPELLATE BODY

1/28/2016 4:28 PM

269

Civil society follows WTO decisions in these areas more closely, and domestic
pressure on respondent governments not to comply can be significant. These
types of cases arguably have spurred a corresponding softening of WTO
jurisprudence in this area (especially regarding GATT Article XX defenses and
their analogues) to reduce civil society challenges to the WTO for privileging
trade over social welfare concerns, and correspondingly to ease compliance
165
prospects.
The more AB jurisprudence moves toward accommodating
Members’ policy choices regardless of their impact on trade, the less it
implicates state behavior, constraining the AB’s overall power.
Members may also recognize the AB’s formal legal authority to interpret
WTO law but evade its impact and thus again constrain its overall power to
meaningfully shape nation-state behavior. One tactic is “foot dragging.” The
United States, for example, delays complying with WTO rulings, such as
antidumping rulings, by forcing Members to litigate cases one by one, which
166
enables the United States to slow changes to its practices. At times, such foot
dragging can give a WTO member increased flexibility to eventually formally
comply with an AB ruling but without any economic consequences because of
the delay. This delay tactic often occurs in safeguards cases, in which WTO
rules permit a Member, on certain conditions, to maintain a safeguard action
167
against imports for three years without being subject to retaliation. Because it
can take three years to fully litigate such WTO cases, and because there are no
retrospective remedies for a breach, a Member can impose an illegal safeguard
with impunity for a sustained period, as the United States did in a steel
safeguards case that the Bush Administration adopted in 2002, with the 2004
168
presidential election in mind. Similarly, India lost the India–Autos case against
the United States but, in practice, was able to use the drawn-out dispute
settlement process to continue its local content requirements to develop local
manufacturing know-how and to enhance competitiveness in its automotive
169
sector. Government officials contend that the policy was successful; India now
exports cars to the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia, creating a new
170
hub in regional competition with Thailand and Indonesia.
Another, even more troubling tactic to avoid the WTO’s impact is
165. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of
Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.316–5.339, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted May 22,
2014); Appellate Body Report, United States—Clove Cigarettes Measures Affecting the Production and
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 182, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012).
166. SIMON A. B. SCHROPP, TRADE POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE WTO: A
LAW AND. ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 244n.70 (2014) (citing Appellate Body Report, United States—Final
Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WTO Doc. WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted Apr.
30, 2008)).
167. GUZMAN & PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 530.
168. Elizabeth Becker, In Glare of Politics, Bush Weighs Fate Of Tariffs on Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 2003, at C1.
169. Appellate Body Report, India—Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, ¶ 17, WTO Doc.
WT/DS146/AB/R / WT/DS175/AB/R (adopted Mar. 19, 2002).
170. Interview with Indian official (Jan. 18, 2010).
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“uncompliance,” in which a Member formally complies with a ruling but adopts
other measures that have an equivalent protectionist effect that nullifies the
ruling’s impact. When a party formally complies but then finds another means
to deny market access to the complaining Member, the AB lacks power to
171
change behavior in a meaningful way. One unpublished empirical study found
that imports to a respondent country did not typically increase following a
successful WTO claim, a finding that might give pause to traders hoping to rely
on the WTO dispute settlement system, especially in light of the WTO’s weak
172
system of remedies. China in particular has been accused of adopting such
173
tactics, formally complying in a way that does not result in increased imports.
The United States and the EU have contended that China has gone further by
threatening to retaliate against United States and European companies that
invest in China in order to deter the companies from providing U.S. and EU
officials with necessary background evidence to support a claim, and to lobby
174
the United States or the EU not to bring it. Such a tactic treats the filing of a
legal case as a hostile political act. These tactics appear to have had some
success, reflected in one high-level EU official’s statement at a meeting of
business representatives that bringing a WTO case was like using a “nuclear
175
weapon.”
The geopolitical context for WTO dispute settlement has changed since the
WTO’s creation, which also could pose challenges for the AB’s authority. In
particular, the BRIC nations have grown in economic importance and the
United States and the EU have declined as economic powers. If powerful
Members such as the United States and the EU believe that China takes
advantage of WTO rules while engaging in policies that provide it with trade
advantages—such as U.S. politicians’ contention that China intentionally
intervenes in currency markets to advantage Chinese exports—then the entire
system is at risk. If a powerful country such as the United States no longer has
faith that the dispute settlement system can resolve trade concerns in line with
its long-term interests, the system could unravel.
There have been, in parallel, more aggressive challenges to AB
interpretations. A number of antidumping practitioners in the Washington,
D.C. trade bar, some former trade negotiators, and a former high-level
171. See generally David J. Townsend & Steve Charnovitz, Preventing Opportunistic Uncompliance
by WTO Members, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 437 (2011) (showing that WTO members can “uncomply”
without facing economic consequences).
172. Stephen Chaudoin, Jeffrey Kucik & Krysztof Pelc, Do WTO Disputes Actually Increase Trade?
(Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n 2013 Ann. Meeting Paper, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2299651; cf. Chad Bown, On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 811–23 (2004) (finding a positive, albeit very small, increase in imports following a
dispute).
173. Timothy Webster, Paper Compliance: How China Implements WTO Decisions, 35 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 525, 562 (2014).
174. Interviews with former USTR official and European legal counsel (2013–2014); see also Keith
Bradsher, Firms that Challenge China on Trade Face Cybertheft, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at B1.
175. Discussion with participant at such meeting, in London, U.K. (May 14, 2014).

SHAFFER_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2016]

AUTHORITY OF THE WTO APPELLATE BODY

1/28/2016 4:28 PM

271

secretariat member have accused the AB of “judicial activism” that has
176
undermined the prospects for future negotiations. Although law is always
subject to different interpretations and some of these commentators and their
clients have stakes in that interpretation, the failure of the Doha negotiations
(other than a marginal Trade Facilitation Agreement) shows that there is
considerable imbalance between the WTO dispute settlement and political
institutions. If the political system cannot correct what, in particular, powerful
Members view as unwarranted AB interpretations, then Members may become
disaffected or appoint less independent AB members.
The selection process of new AB members has correspondingly become
177
more politicized. This politicization threatens the AB’s authority by calling
into question its judicial independence. AB Member David Unterhalter
powerfully evoked these concerns in his January 2014 farewell speech regarding
the threat to the independence of AB members from the appointment process
and thus the “legitimacy and authority of the WTO dispute settlement
178
system.” While the screening processes of candidates in Geneva and capitals
were originally rather light and politicization was more about reputational
effects of having a national on the AB, today WTO Members explore through
179
careful screening the exact preferences and dispositions of candidates. This
increased politicization became manifest in the 2013 through 2014 deadlock
over the appointment for the successor of David Unterhalter. WTO Members
were unable to reach consensus given that there were two African candidates
(one Kenyan and one Egyptian) who had support from powerful WTO
180
Members, and no side was willing to capitulate. In particular, the United
States refused to support the candidacy of Professor James Gathii, the Kenyan
candidate, a Chicago-based law professor who was not part of the Geneva
diplomatic community but who otherwise appeared to have support from the
vast majority of the membership, including the EU. In September 2014, the
DSB finally appointed Mr. Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing, a career
diplomat of Mauritius without a law degree, to fill the vacant position. To the
extent the WTO membership chooses AB members based on their sensitivity to
diplomatic concerns rather than legal expertise, the AB’s reputation and its
authority outside of a narrow Geneva community could decline. The resulting
AB rulings could provide less principled guidance for future dispute settlement,
thus also reducing the AB’s intermediate authority.

176. See, e.g., Terence P. Stewart et al., The Increasing Recognition of Problems with WTO
Appellate Body Decision-Making: Will the Message Be Heard? 8 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 390
(2013); Cartland et al., supra note 78, at 989–91.
177. Manfred Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and
Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 391, 393–94, 405
(2014).
178. David Unterhaler, Appellate Body Member, WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Farewell Speech
in Geneva, CH (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/unterhalterspeech_e.htm.
179. Elsig & Pollack, supra note 177, at 404–07.
180. Discussion with an AB Member (Jan. 28, 2014).

SHAFFER_1-13 (DO NOT DELETE)

272

1/28/2016 4:28 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79:237

The United States and other Members already have turned away from the
WTO for purposes of trade negotiations, as witnessed in the proliferation of
preferential trade agreements, particularly the negotiation of agreements
involving significant amounts of global trade, such as the Transpacific
Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which
181
may have their own dispute settlement mechanisms. Even if these treaties are
adopted and new mechanisms are created, the WTO dispute settlement system
could remain dominant because of the multilateral publicity it casts, which can
more effectively induce compliance on account of broader reciprocity and
reputational effects. However, if the United States, EU, and others turn to these
bilateral and plurilateral dispute settlement mechanisms for disputes among
them, this move could significantly weaken the authority of the AB. If the
dispute settlement bodies under these agreements become more active, they
could also increase jurisdictional conflicts over the interpretation of similar
substantive provisions.
Data presented earlier on public interest in the WTO measured by proxies
such as output of the academic community (Figure 2) and participation by
private actors in the WTO Public Forum (Figure 3) shows signs of declining
public interest. Although these changes might relate to the lack of progress in
the Doha Round negotiations, they also raise questions regarding the WTO’s
and AB’s larger public profiles. If they decline, so may the AB’s extensive
authority.
VI
CONCLUSION
The WTO AB’s rapid development of extensive authority is a unique case in
international politics at the multilateral level. Contrary to most assumptions,
the AB shows how the development of IC authority is not necessarily
evolutionary, going through progressive stages from narrow authority (between
litigants) to intermediate authority (before a similarly situated group) to
extensive field-level authority (before a broader audience of government
officials, other courts, legal professionals, business associations, civil society
organizations, and academics). The establishment of extensive AB authority
represents a legalization leap in which international dispute settlement moved
rapidly, and almost instantaneously, from limited narrow authority under the
GATT to significantly more expansive authority.
181. FINAL
REPORT,
U.S.–EU
HIGH
LEVEL WORKING GROUP,
FINAL
REPORT JOBS AND GROWTH 6 (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/02132013%20
FINAL%20HLWG%20REPORT.pdf; U.S., EU Announce Decision to Launch Negotiations on a
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 13, 2013), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/
2013/february/statement-US-EU-Presidents. Since 2008, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement has
been under negotiation by Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. IAN E. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 1 (2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40502.pdf.
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The AB’s authority, although extensive, nonetheless remains fragile. The
WTO is still an interstate dispute settlement system, so private parties have no
direct access to the AB. The AB thus directly confronts state pressure and at
times shapes its decisions to facilitate Member compliance with them. The AB
appears to be under greater pressure today than at any other time in the WTO’s
history. States created the AB and they can also undermine it, especially
powerful ones such as the United States. Although the AB still enjoys
significant power to shape state behavior, its authority is threatened by major
geopolitical shifts, such as the rise of China as an economic power, the failures
of the WTO negotiating process and Members’ corresponding turn to other
treaties for trade negotiations that provide potential new fora for dispute
settlement, and accusations from the United States—in particular, of AB
“judicial activism” that appears to be aimed at curtailing the AB’s authority.
For the moment, AB authority is extensive. But just as the AB’s authority
rapidly and almost instantaneously rose, so it could rapidly fall. AB members
appear to be conscious of the limits of their authority and have shaped their
jurisprudence to ease Members’ concerns. But even while they have some
agency to induce compliance and reliance on the system, broader structural
changes and potential U.S. disenchantment could pose deeper challenges to the
AB’s authority, which shows signs of decline.

